Climate Change and Conflict: the Darfur Conflict and Syrian Civil War by Smith, Evan Gray
University of Vermont 
ScholarWorks @ UVM 
UVM College of Arts and Sciences College 
Honors Theses Undergraduate Theses 
2020 
Climate Change and Conflict: the Darfur Conflict and Syrian Civil 
War 
Evan Gray Smith 
The University of Vermont 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses 
Recommended Citation 
Smith, Evan Gray, "Climate Change and Conflict: the Darfur Conflict and Syrian Civil War" (2020). UVM 
College of Arts and Sciences College Honors Theses. 70. 
https://scholarworks.uvm.edu/castheses/70 
This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Theses at 
ScholarWorks @ UVM. It has been accepted for inclusion in UVM College of Arts and Sciences College Honors 








Climate Change and Conflict: the Darfur 















Peter Henne Ph.D, Thesis Advisor 






As the impacts of climate change grow more apparent, policy makers and scholars have become 
increasingly interested in the relationship between climate change and conflict, but their analyses 
have shown ambiguous results. In this thesis, I analyze this relationship in two cases: the Sudan 
Darfur Conflict (2003-present) and the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). I argue that climate 
change functioned as an intermediate variable in each case, influencing other factors known to 
have contributed to the conflict. I find that climate change would have been unlikely to cause 
either conflict in isolation. Rather, climate change exacerbated the conflicts by making the 
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Within the last twenty years, many intrastate conflicts have proliferated across the Middle East, 
Africa, and Asia. But as intrastate conflicts such as the Darfur Conflict and the Syrian Civil War 
continue to make headlines, a less visible phenomenon is preparing to alter the trajectory of 
future conflicts. Climate change has become an increasingly salient issue in recent years. Despite 
the attention climate change has been getting by the mainstream media, policy makers, and 
activists, its effects, both in the present and the future, are largely unknown. The effects of 
climate change on conflict, in particular, are puzzling. Policy makers and scholars have become 
increasingly aware of the risks involved with climate change and conflict. While policy makers 
have been quick to make connections between the two, scholars are more conservative in their 
assessments of the relationship. There there has been a great wealth of literature on the 
relationship between climate change and conflict in recent years, but scholars have yet to reach 
any definitive answer. Can the relationship between climate change and conflict be determined? 
This thesis seeks to address this question and determine the degree to which climate change 
interacts with conflict.  
Darfur and Syria 
Among policy makers and scholars, there are two cases that consistently appear in discussions on 
climate change and conflict, the Sudan Darfur Conflict (2003-present) and the Syrian Civil War 
(2011-present). The Darfur Conflict began with small-scale armed disputes between “Arab” 
nomadic tribes and African settled agriculturalists over access to water and arable land in Darfur, 
a semi-arid region in the west of the country. It would soon evolve into a conflict with organized 
rebel groups opposing the Sudanese Arab-supremacist government, and Arab militias, many of 
Smith, 2 
 
which committed genocidal campaigns against African tribes with the support of the al-Bashir 
regime. The conflict continues today but to a much more limited degree.  
Prior to the conflict, increasing desertification and a severe drought pushed Arab pastoral 
tribes south to seek water and grazing land for their herds. This brought them into conflict with 
the African settled communities who were also struggling because of the drought. Many credit 
the desertification and drought to climate change. If climate change led to the migration of the 
nomads , surely climate change must have contributed to the conflict. 
 The Syria case emerged in a completely different political environment. The Syrian Civil 
War has its roots in widespread protest movements against the al-Assad regime throughout the 
country’s cities. This was inspired in part by the success of the Arab Spring movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt, but it was the corruption of the Syrian government and their poor economic 
policies that drove many to protest. These protests were brutally suppressed. In response to these 
atrocities, a myriad of rebel groups with contrasting aims and international supporters rose 
against the government, beginning the Syrian Civil War. The conflict is ongoing, but the 
dynamics of the war has shifted significantly from year to year.  
It is possible that climate change had a role to play in this conflict as well. Like in Darfur, 
a devastating drought appeared in Syria, threatening the livelihoods of many Syrians in rural 
areas, especially in the northeast of the country, during the late 2000s. Many affected Syrians had 
no choice but to migrate to cities to seek employment and better their living conditions. These 
migrants exacerbated many economic stressors already present in the cities such as 
unemployment, the result of the Syrian government’s liberalization of the economy. Many of 
these migrants were also upset with the government’s poor response to the drought. The al-Assad 
regime invested heavily into water and rural infrastructure, but the waterworks were poorly 
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managed and unsustainable. As a result, the irrigation network of Syria was unable to mediate 
the effects of the drought because of Syria’s already significant water stress.  
Difficulties Associated with Studying Climate Change and Conflict 
Studying the relationship between climate change and conflict presents some challenges. For 
one, the causes of conflict are multidimensional and nuanced, even without the presence of 
climate change, and cannot be attributed to one variable. There is a consensus among scholars 
that climate change does not directly affect conflict. It can influence other, more well-defined, 
triggers of conflict, however. The nature of such an indirect relationship would be difficult to 
determine, as shown above. In order to determine the influence of climate change on conflict, it 
is necessary to understand the many causal pathways to conflict for each case. Another challenge 
in connecting climate change to conflict is that the effects of climate change cannot be easily 
discerned. For instance, a drought may be caused by changes in climate, but also through 
weather anomalies and cyclical events or even human interference. In order to determine any 
relationship between climate change and conflict, the presence and effects of climate change 
must be verified.  
Significance of Understanding the Relationship 
Regardless of these problems, it is important to develop an understanding of the relationship 
between climate change and conflict. There are some important policy implications here. A solid 
theoretical understanding could provide valuable insight into the potential conflict triggers 
influenced by climate change. This would help identify risk factors for conflicts in regions 
particularly vulnerable to climate change or unable to effectively mitigate its negative 
consequences. Secondly, policy makers are quick to warn of the dangerous possibility that 
climate change could increase the risk of conflict, while academia has yet to reach a consensus. 
Smith, 4 
 
Understanding the relationship could prove whether policy makers are right to be concerned and 
if measures should be taken. Lastly, the effects of intrastate conflicts are often not restricted to 
their original countries. The Syrian Migrant Crisis, terrorist attacks, and fluctuations in the 
supply and price of oil for instance, have their roots in the Syrian Civil War, a conflict often 
attributed in part to climate change. Preventing or mitigating conflicts with can prevent spillover 
and the implications of the conflict on people’s livelihoods and safety.  
Organization and Argument 
In the next section, I will review the existing literature on the climate change – conflict 
relationship, determine the general trends, and describe how my thesis will prove a unique 
contribution to the literature. In the methodology section, I will explain the basis for my case 
study selection and present my own model for analysis. I will argue that climate change 
functions as an intermediate variable, indirectly contributing to conflict through its influence on 
other variables, while being mediated by state capability and economic strength. In the two case 
studies, the Sudan Darfur Conflict and the Syrian Civil War, I will provide an overview of the 
causal pathways from climate change to conflict as well as from traditional factors to conflict. I 
will then analyze whether the conflict would have occurred with only the presence of climate 
change or if the presence of traditional factors were required for the conflict to begin. This 
analysis will allow me to conclude whether climate change served as an intermediate variable. In 
the next and last section, I will compare the findings from my two case studies and determine the 





CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
The field of conflict studies has been especially interested in the effects of climate change in 
recent years. Even though the environmental threats of climate change are clear, scholars do not 
yet understand how it interacts with conflict. An understanding of the relationship between 
climate change and conflict could provide insight into other causal pathways to conflict. It could 
explain how past conflicts may have been shaped by climate change and the scope to which 
climate change can affect conflicts in the future. Answers to these questions are especially 
valuable as they can be applied to prevent or mitigate future conflicts. As such, this new niche 
within conflict studies is clearly an important topic to study. Unfortunately, scholars studying the 
climate change-conflict relationship have not been able to reach any clear conclusions on the 
nature of the relationship. 
 In this section, I will briefly review the current understandings of the relationship 
between climate change and conflict among scholars and identify the current trends in the 
literature. There have already been considerable efforts in reviewing the contemporary literature 
on climate change and conflict. As such, I will analyze a sample of works I find to best represent 
the literature as a whole. I will conclude by arguing how my thesis will provide a unique 
contribution to this increasingly crowded field.  
Current Interpretations of the Climate Change-Conflict Relationship 
The current limited understanding of the climate change-conflict relationship makes it difficult to 
summarize the general trends of the literature. Works within the field are highly nuanced, 
dependent on context, or draw different conclusions from similar data. These complications are 
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exacerbated by the vast diversity and novelty of methods used. In response, scholars have 
produced a sizable number of comprehensive reviews that illustrate the inconclusiveness of the 
literature. The number of reviews, however, is reaching a saturation point. In 2017, Tobias Ide in 
a review of the research methods used in climate-change studies found that 18% of the literature 
was composed of solely theoretical works or literature reviews, the second most popular type of 
analysis after large-N statistical analysis.1 This is a rather high percentage for this type of study. 
It is important that new studies in the field of climate change – conflict studies do not rely on 
literature reviews and instead adopt more empirical methods of analysis. As such, instead of 
conducting another review of the literature at large, I will conduct a metanalysis of the existing 
body of literature reviews and discuss the different conclusions they provide. With these 
conclusions, I will identify three different understandings of climate change within the literature: 
climate change as a threat multiplier, climate change as a conditional and interacting factor, and 
climate change as an insignificant factor.  
The Indirect Nature of Climate Change 
There is currently little consensus among scholars on the nature of the climate change-
conflict relationship. Sakaguchi, Varughese, and Auld in a 2017 study find inconclusive 
evidence for the presence of a relationship between climate change and conflict within the 
literature. According to their analysis, 62.3% of studies find a positive relationship between the 
two variables, 34.8% present neutral findings, and just 2.8% find a negative relationship.2 The 
 
1 Thomas Ide, “Research Methods for Exploring the Links between Climate Change and Conflict,” edited by 
Timothy Carter, Domain Editor, and Mike Hulme, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 8, no. 3 (2017): 
3, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.456. 
2 Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varughese, and Graeme Auld, “Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical 
Analyses on the Links between Climate Change and Violent Conflict.” International Studies Review 19, no. 4 (May 
2017): 634, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix022. 
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authors, however, stress that the articles within their study present their findings differently and 
employ a considerable diversity of research methods. Further, they find that the majority of 
studies consider the relationship to be indirect. While a few studies argue that climate change can 
have a direct influence on violence, most believe that climate change operates on conflict 
through a “complex set of mediating and/or interacting variables.”3 The definition of these 
interacting and mediating variables, however, are often unclear, and are not well supported by 
empirical evidence.4 
Koubi also presents a complicated picture of the literature. Like Sakaguchi et al., she 
finds that a majority of climate change – conflict literature finds a positive relationship and one 
that is indirect, operating through climate change’s effects on socio-political and economic 
factors.5 Koubi finds little evidence within the literature of a direct connection between the two 
phenomena. She also emphasizes that the relationship must continue to be studied with an 
awareness of its indirect nature. Otherwise, climate change may be given too much credence 
compared to other more significant factors. In this vein, Koubi argues that while there may not 
be a direct connection between climate change and conflict, the literature generally defines 
climate change as a “threat multiplier.” 6 As a threat multiplier, climate change does not cause 
conflict, but it does increase the propensity for conflict in vulnerable areas, i.e. areas in which the 
dependent political and socio-economic factors are present.    
Mach et al. surveyed scholars of the climate change-conflict relationship to determine the 
different understandings of the relationship. According to the results of the survey, most scholars 
 
3 Ibid., 624, see also 630-1. 
4 Ibid., 641. 
5Vally Koubi, “Climate Change and Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 343–60, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830. 
6 Ibid., 355.  
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agree that climate change is likely to increase the risk for conflict, but other factors are believed 
to be much more significant.7 Therefore, climate change is a threat multiplier, but one with 
limited influence. The experts cited four influential factors that contribute to conflict: “low 
socioeconomic development, low capabilities of the state, intergroup inequality […] and recent 
history of violent conflict.”8 These factors would fit into the general categories of socio-political 
and economic factors that Koubi identified in her study. These are not climate factors, or even 
generic geographical factors, but they can be influenced in some way by climate change that may 
contribute to conflict. Still, while the experts surveyed do not believe climate change is a major 
contributor to conflict, it was cited as the factor they were most uncertain about.9  
Criticism of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier 
Other scholars disagree with the threat multiplier dynamic. Salehyan would agree with the 
consensus found in the Mach et al. study that the relationship between climate change and 
conflict is not direct. In contrast, however, he finds that climate change is only likely to influence 
conflict only if certain existing socio-political and economic conditions are present. 10 According 
to Salehyan, not only are these factors more important than climate, they are also necessary for 
climate change to have any real impact. The influence of climate change on conflict is 
manifested only in its interactions with other variables.11 Barnett and Adger reach a similar 
conclusion. They write that “climate change will not undermine human security or increase the 
 
7 Katharine J. Mach et al., “Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict,” Nature 571 (2019): 195, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1300-6. 
8 Ibid., 194. 
9 Ibid., 195. 
10 Idean Salehyan, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 3 




risk of violent conflict in isolation from other important social factors.”12 In their article they find 
that climate change increases the chance of conflict by affecting natural resource distribution, 
state capacity, and the general wellbeing of citizens, but only in cases where these factors are 
already at risk.13  
Critics of the threat multiplier dynamic also believe it has potential for abuse. In his article, 
Salehyan suggests that scholars may erroneously attribute conflict to climate change when the 
conflict was actually caused by government abuse or poor public resource management.14 
Salehyan stresses that scholars must make sure to distinguish exogenous climate factors from the 
influence of governments. Otherwise, the rhetoric surrounding climate change may enable 
decisionmakers to avoid responsibility “for civil wars and grave human rights violations.”15 This 
sentiment is shared by Gleditsch and Nordås. They write that the conversation around climate 
change and conflict may be manipulated by governments and rebel militant groups to shift 
accountability for their actions from themselves to “developed countries and their greenhouse 
gas emissions.”16 Selby and Hoffmann also express concern. They argue that the security 
narrative around climate change and conflict may become “self-fulfilling,” being used as a 
rhetorical device to legitimize government-sanctioned violence.17  
 
12 Barnett, Jon, and W. Neil Adger. “Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict.” Political 
Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 644. 
13 Ibid., 646-651. 
14 Salehyan, “From Climate Change to Conflict?,” 317. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ragnhild Nordås, "Climate Change and Conflict: A Critical Overview," Die Friedens-
Warte (2010): 7-24, accessed September 14, 2020 from www.jstor.org/stable/23773941. 
17 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann. “Introduction: Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict and 
Security,” Geopolitics 19, no. 4 (2014): 754, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.964866. 
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The potential to abuse the discourse around climate change and conflict narrative is 
strengthened because of its prevalence in policy circles.18 Many policy makers believe climate 
change is a threat multiplier that will cause or worsen conflicts around the world. This rhetorical 
argument has been often repeated by American defense agencies and officials, the U.N., various 
NGOs, and relevant agencies of countries including the United Kingdom and Germany.19 In their 
frequent use of a climate change – conflict connection adds legitimacy to the claim, even when 
other factors are more significant. As the connection becomes more and more legitimate, it will 
increasingly be applied erroneously and labeled a force majeure, allowing governments a new 
rhetorical device to escape responsibility. 
In addition to its potential for abuse, Abrahams and Carr argue that the threat multiplier 
narrative will lead to poor policy. It suggests that the relationship between climate change and 
conflict is “unidirectional” and does not inform policy makers about the temporal and spatial 
dynamics of climate change.20 According to Abrahams and Carr, climate change can operate on 
conflict in other, less obvious directions. They specifically cite two other possible directions in 
their article: the potential for climate change mitigation to exacerbate conflict, and the potential 
for peacebuilding.21 These other directions are often unappreciated by scholars. It is prudent to 
recognize other directions through which climate change may operate on conflict. 
 
 
18 Daniel Abrahams and Edward R. Carr, “Understanding the Connections Between Climate Change and Conflict: 
Contributions from Geography and Political Ecology,” Current Climate Change Reports 3, no. 4 (2017): 234, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2014.964866. 
19 Gleditsch and Nordås, “Climate Change and Conflict: A Critical Overview,” 9-10; Selby and Hoffmann, 
“Introduction: Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict and Security,” 747, 749-50. 





 Some works are even more skeptical, arguing that the role of climate change is essentially 
insignificant, indeterminable, or devoid of any evidential support. Gleditsch and Nordås, argue 
that while climate change is surely going to negatively affect the security of “already vulnerable 
societies and weak governments,” the literature presents “little if any solid evidence” of the 
existence of a causal relationship between climate change and conflict, including through both 
direct and indirect means.22 In a 2013 study, Gleditsch along with Theisen and Buhaug, reach the 
same conclusion. They admit that climate change is likely to reduce the wellbeing of many 
people in vulnerable areas, but they struggle to find evidence that it will lead to conflict.23 Selby 
and Hoffmann on the other hand take a firmer stance. They argue that the threat multiplier 
narrative is “Malthusian” in nature, and informed by assumptions and environmental 
determinism, rather than empirical data.24 These skeptical arguments have merit, but the absence 
of evidence should not discourage future research in the field. The nature of climate change and 
conflict remains inconclusive but further studies into this complicated relationship can make it 
clearer. 
Summary 
This is only a small sample of the many works within the literature. Nonetheless, this sample 
reveals the extent to which scholars are divided about the nature of the climate change-conflict 
relationship. There seem to be two distinct factions present, as well as a smaller group of 
skeptical studies. The first faction argues that climate change has an indirect influence on 
 
22 Gleditsch and Nordås, "Climate Change and Conflict: A Critical Overview," 18. 
23 Ole Magnus Theisen, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug, “Is Climate Change a Driver of Armed 
Conflict?,” Climatic Change 117, no. 3 (2013): 622-3, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-012-0649-4. 
24 Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann. “Introduction: Rethinking Climate Change, Conflict and Security,” 748. 
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conflict, as a sort of threat multiplier. Conflict is more likely in the presence of climate change, 
and the existence of certain socio-political and economic factors make conflict even more likely. 
The other faction dismisses the threat multiplier position. They argue that climate change only 
has an impact in cases when certain sociopolitical and economic conditions are met. In these 
cases, climate change has an interacting effect on other variables that contribute to conflict. 
Lastly, there are a few works that are more skeptical, doubting whether climate change is even a 
pertinent factor in relation to conflict. 
Despite their differences, the two major factions would agree on three points. First, the 
influence of climate change on conflict is not that significant, although many acknowledge that 
its significance may change as the effects of climate change intensify. Second, climate change 
operates on conflict indirectly through its effects on other socioeconomic and political factors. 
And third, the mechanisms through which climate change interacts with conflict are inconclusive 
and complicated. These three points suggest a limited consensus among scholars, but there are 
still fundamental disagreements on the nature of the climate change-conflict relationship. As 
more works populate this nascent field, and better research methods are discovered and utilized, 
we may find a consensus develop on one of these positions, or even on a completely unexplored 
conclusion.  
A New Path of Study 
My thesis will prove a unique contribution to the literature in three ways. First, most studies 
focus on whether climate change causes conflict. While I will address this question, I will also 
examine how climate change can exacerbate conflict when other factors are known to cause the 
conflict in isolation from climate change. Secondly, most qualitative studies address a single case 
of conflict. In order to gain a broader understanding of the climate change-conflict relationship, I 
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will be conducting a comprehensive comparative analysis of two cases within the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA), the Darfur Conflict in Sudan and the Syrian Civil War. These two 
cases have attracted a lot of interest among scholars, but I could not find any works comparing 
the two qualitatively. Even with the recent interest, MENA is a region that is underrepresented in 
the climate change-conflict literature, especially when compared to global, African, and Asian 
studies.25 Lastly, I will be considering climate change an intermediate variable, which indirectly 
affects conflict by influencing external factors while being mediated by the present 
socioeconomic, geographic, and political conditions of the case. Many scholars inadvertently 
adopt this idea, but do not reduce it into a theoretical framework. In my thesis, however, I will 
explain how climate change operates theoretically as an intermediate variable. This will be 









25 Sakaguchi et al., “Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links between Climate 
Change and Violent Conflict,” 639. Note: In the review, the African category does include North Africa but most of 
the literature analyzed is limited to cases within sub-Saharan Africa. The authors do define the Middle East as a 
distinct region apart from Asia. 
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CHAPTER II: METHODOLOGY 
 
In this section, I will present my methodology for analyzing the relationship between climate 
change and conflict in Darfur and Syria. First, I will briefly review how conflict scholars have 
analyzed the climate change-conflict relationship through a wide assortment of data collection 
methods and theoretical frameworks. I will then describe how I will approach the relationship, 
with climate change functioning as an intermediate variable. Afterward, I will clarify why I 
chose my case studies and explain how they will be conducted. I will then delineate the causal 
pathways to conflict that will be explored in the thesis. Lastly, I will produce a framework for a 
final comparative analysis to develop a unique theoretical framework for understanding the 
relationship.  
Methodology Review 
The literature on the relationship between climate change and conflict applies an impressive 
variety of robust theoretical frameworks, and quantitative and qualitative methods. In a broad 
sense, contemporary research designs on climate change and conflict can be divided into the 
following three categories: large-scale quantitative studies with a global perspective,26 reviews of 
existing literature,27 and local case studies.28 The preference for most scholars is quantitative 
studies, often taking the form of large n-statistical analyses. In 2017, Tobias Ide, in a review of 
the research methods used by climate change – conflict researchers, found that large n-statistical 
 
26 See Guy J. Abel, Michael Brottrager, Jesus Crespo Cuaresma, and Raya Muttarak, “Climate, Conflict and Forced 
Migration,” Global Environmental Change 54 (2019): 239–49, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2018.12.003. 
27 See Vally Koubi, “Climate Change and Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 343–60, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-050317-070830 or Kendra Sakaguchi, Anil Varughese, and Graeme Auld, 
“Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links between Climate Change and Violent 
Conflict,” International Studies Review 19, no. 4 (May 2017): 622–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/vix022. 
28 See Jan Selby and Clemens Hoffmann, “Beyond Scarcity: Rethinking Water, Climate Change and Conflict in the 
Sudans,” Global Environmental Change 29 (2014): 360–70, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.008.  
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analysis made up 60% of the literature between 2007 and 2015 while qualitative studies only 
make up 9% of the literature within the same time frame.29 It is noteworthy that a considerable 
portion of the existing literature is composed of literature reviews. 18% of the literature analyzed 
in Ide’s review was composed of solely theoretical works or literature reviews, the second most 
popular type of analysis after large-N statistical analysis.30 This is a rather high percentage for 
this type of study. It is important that new studies in the field of climate change – conflict studies 
do not rely on literature reviews and instead adopt more empirical methods of analysis.  
Qualitative cases studies make up a small minority of the works on climate change and 
conflict, only 9%,31 but can be a powerful tool for testing the relationship. As I will be using case 
studies for my analysis, I will go into more detail on how they are typically conducted within the 
field of climate change – conflict studies. Ide argues that most case studies adopt a similar 
format. First, the causal pathways to conflict are analyzed through process tracing. According to 
George and Bennett, “[t]he process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal 
process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.”32 This is a powerful method for analyzing 
such a complicated, indirect, and non-linear relationship as climate change and conflict, and is 
especially useful for comprehensive within-case studies. The exploration of the causal chain or 
pathway allows for the presentation of a more straight-forward linear narrative.33 Then the 
relationships between all the variables can be explored and contextualized into “broader socio-
 
29 Tobias Ide, “Research Methods for Exploring the Links between Climate Change and Conflict.” Edited by 




32 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 206. 
33 Ide, “Research Methods for Exploring the Links between Climate Change and Conflict,” 3. 
Smith, 16 
 
political structures,” showing how the variables do not act in isolation from one another and 
explain how local context matters for each case.34  
Climate Change as an Intermediate Variable 
How do scholars define the relationship between climate change and conflict? It may be 
expected that climate change would be an independent variable, but this is not the case. In a 2017 
literature review of 69 peer-reviewed articles, Sakaguchi, Varughese, and Auld find that most 
climate change – conflict scholars agree that climate change cannot be interpreted as a single 
independent direct cause of conflict.35 Climate change acts upon conflict indirectly through its 
influence on a suite of variables dependent to the case. It varies the dependent variable (i.e. 
conflict) through its effects on independent variables, that in turn influence the dependent 
variable. The effects of climate change can also be “mediated” by socioeconomic and geographic 
conditions in cases such as favorable socioeconomic conditions, state capacity, or geography.36 
The indirect nature of climate change, in addition to its potential to be mediated, led Feitelson 
and Tubi to define climate change as an “intermediate variable” in their 2017 study on climate 
change and conflict in the Euphrates and Jordan basins.”37 Arguably most works on climate 
change and conflict recognize climate change as an intermediate variable but do not refer to it as 
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Intermediate variables operate within causal pathways. Within studies on climate change 
and conflict, Sakaguchi et al. find that causal pathways come in four forms: direct, interacting, 
mediating, and a combination of mediation and interacting.38 The above figure from their article 
illustrates these pathways succinctly. The direct path (A) envisions climate change as having a 
direct effect on conflict. Very few studies use this method and this path has largely been 
discredited among scholars. In an interacting path (B), climate change operates on conflict 
through its influence on other variables such as economic factors and migration. The mediation 
path (C), as explained above, suggests that the effects of climate change can be mediated by 
 
38 Sakaguchi et al., “Climate Wars? A Systematic Review of Empirical Analyses on the Links between Climate 
Change and Violent Conflict,” 630-631. 
Figure 2.1 Causal Pathways from Climate Change to Conflict 
Source: Sakaguchi et al. (2017), 631. 
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external factors. Lastly, climate change can have an effect on variables within the interacting 
path, while also being mediated by other factors (path D). The variables that climate change 
affects, or that mediate climate change, are all specific to the context of the case. 
Defining climate change as an intermediate variable is similar to defining it as a threat 
multiplier, but they are not the same. The intermediate variable framework is more closely 
aligned to the critical scholarship examined in the literature review. Climate change is likely to 
increase the effects of conflict, but it often requires other traditional factors to be present such as 
economic troubles or poor state capacity. Not only do these factors increase the risk, their 
presence may also be necessary for climate change to have any effect. The threat multiplier 
narrative ignores this possibility in favor of a more simplistic and digestible model. It suggests 
that climate change may play a role more significant than traditional factors. Furthermore, the 
narrative suggests that climate change is a causative factor, rather than an interacting one. 
Generally, it has been largely used a vague policy term, rather than an accurate model of the 
climate change-conflict relationship.  
Framework 
In my thesis, I will treat climate change as an intermediate variable that may influence the 
propensity for conflict and exacerbate or prolong existing conflicts. As Sakaguchi et al. find, 
many climate change – conflict scholars treat climate change as an intermediate variable, but 
they do not define it as such nor explain how it operates theoretically. I will explain how climate 
change operates on conflict through its influence on independent variables in the interacting path. 
My two case studies do not find evidence that climate change was being mediated by any factor, 
so I will not be adopting the mediation or combinatory paths in my analysis. This does not mean 
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that these two paths should be discredited, rather it shows how the context of each case matters 
for determining the relationship between climate change and conflict. 
Case Studies 
I will be conducting two case studies in my thesis, the Sudan Darfur conflict (2003-
present) and the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). These selections were made based on their 
comparative potential and their frequent use among scholars and policy makers. These two cases 
have both resulted in conflict, but they are differentiated by geography, political and 
socioeconomic conditions, and climate change sensitivity. These differentiations suggest that 
climate change may have affected the causal pathways to conflict in unique ways for each case. 
Within the case studies, I will use process tracing to track the influence of climate change on 
independent variables within the intermediate path. By following the interacting path, I can 
prove climate change influenced conflict if it varied factors in in the intermediate path known to 
contribute to the conflict.  
Comparative Analysis 
In my analysis, I will use the “‘controlled comparison’” method outlined in George and 
Bennet’s book on case study methodology39 As stipulated by this method, the dependent 
variable, i.e. conflict, is consistent across all cases while the independent variables (i.e. causal 
pathways to conflict) are different.40 The presence of climate change is held consistent as well. 
All my cases have resulted in conflict, but undoubtedly climate change has influenced the causal 
pathways to the conflicts in different ways. Through a comparison of my case study findings, I 
 




will be able to determine what effects, if any, climate change has on factors within the causal 























During the 1980s, the Darfur region of Sudan experienced two major events that would shape the 
region in the coming decades. The first was a devastating drought and subsequent famine 
between 1980 and 1985. As a result of increasingly arid conditions in Darfur’s pastures, the 
region’s ethnically Arab pastoral groups were forced to migrate their herds south to find food 
and water.41 These nomadic groups encroached on cropland owned by settled African 
agriculturalists who were also suffering from the drought. In order to protect their land, crops, 
and water supplies, the settled agriculturalists took up arms against the nomads.42 This conflict 
would foreshadow the one in 2003 that is the focus of this case study. The second event was a 
military coup led by a Sudanese officer, Omar al-Bashir in 1989. Al-Bashir would assume the 
title of President of Sudan until he himself was ousted in a coup in 2019. Al Bashir’s regime 
heavily favored ethnic Arabs in Darfur and supported Arab nomadic groups in their conflicts 
over land with the African agriculturalists.43 
In 2003, rebel groups in Darfur organized in protest of Al-Bashir’s support of the Arabs. 
By this time, other environmental pressures again forced Arab nomadic groups to compete with 
settled African agriculturists for land, food, and water. The nomadic “Arabs” and the settled 
 
41 Charles-Édouard de Ramaix, “Migration and Relief Action in Drought-Affected Darfur,” in The State of 
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“Africans” would weaponize their differences, learning to see each other as competitors for life’s 
most basic necessities: food and water. To counter the African rebel groups, many Arabs from 
nomadic tribes organized themselves into hostile bands. In addition to combatting the rebels, 
Arab militias have committed atrocities on African settlements. The most notorious of such 
militias, is the Janjiweed, a paramilitary group that was supported in part by the sympathetic al-
Bashir regime. The Janjiweed have been the vanguard in a campaign of ethnic cleansing against 
the African population. The conflict is not limited to conflict between Arabs and Africans, 
Figure 3.1 Map of Darfur (highlighted) within Sudan 
Source: Wikipedia, 2011. 
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however. Many Arab pastoral groups have also targeted other Arab tribes in their competition for 
land and resources.44 The same applies to some African settled communities.45 
Many scholars in recent years have discounted the ethnic factors behind the conflict, instead 
focusing on the role of environmental factors and climate change. The main issue of contention 
is the ethnic identity of the Alvarez notes that the Arab tribesman are not really Arab and there is 
no true racial distinction between the two groups.46 Instead, the pastoral tribesman are Africans 
who have undergone a process of Arabization. According to Abouyoub, reducing the conflict to 
an ethnic rivalry simplifies the history of the region in favor of a convenient and easily 
understandable narrative.47 Instead, Alvarez and Abouyoub suggest that we approach the conflict 
from the angle of environmental factors and climate change.  
Many scholars have argued that the inhabitants of Darfur are especially vulnerable to 
environmental fluctuations. Across Sudan, agriculture is a large industry. In 2010, agricultural 
work represented around 80% of the country’s total workforce.48 In the region of Darfur, with its 
chronic and debilitating droughts, the threat to agriculture is especially pronounced. The threat is 
compounded by a noticeable trend throughout the region of decreasing and more variable annual 
rainfall. In addition to water scarcity, Darfur is also experiencing an increasing loss of arable and 
pastoral land to desertification and deforestation. Many scholars like Abouyoub and Alvarez 
have attributed these factors to conflict, but it is not clear if they have been caused or intensified 
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by climate change. What is apparent, however, is that environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity has had a significant effect on the displacement of the Darfurian population, and on their 
ability to survive.  
The potential climate change dimensions of the conflict have not been ignored by the 
international community. In June of 2007, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki 
Moon, authored an op-ed in the Washington Post titled, “A Climate Culprit in Darfur.”49 In his 
piece, Moon first announced that an agreement had been reached among Sudanese President 
Omar al-Bashir and the U.N. to establish a U.N. peacekeeping mission in the war-torn region of 
Darfur. Delivering this promising news was not the only goal of Moon’s editorial, however. He 
also took the opportunity to make a bold argument. Climate change was partially to blame for the 
genocide and armed conflict in Darfur. To support his claim, Moon cited the increased aridity of 
sub-Saharan Africa and recent long-lasting droughts. These devastating environmental 
disturbances, Moon argued, led to conflict for food and water among the settled and pastoral 
communities in the region.  
 In that same month, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) published a 
report, Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, that presented a more nuanced version 
of Moon’s argument. The report detailed how climate change, natural disasters, and 
anthropogenic environmental degradation have affected the conflict in Darfur. In regard to 
climate change specifically, the report cited desertification and declining precipitation as key 
contributing factors.50 Unlike Moon, however, the report does not argue that climate change 
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caused the Darfur conflict. Rather, the conflict was caused by a host of sociopolitical and 
economic factors in which climate change only had an interacting role.  
 Since the conflict began, at least 2.7 million people have been displaced. 51 The number 
of dead remains highly disputed, ranging from the Sudanese Government’s conservative, and 
probably falsified, estimate of 10,000, to the United Nations’ estimate of 300,000,52 to numbers 
exceeding 400,000.53 Mortality figures, however, often include the number of people who have 
died of malnutrition or disease, so they are not representative of deaths stemming directly from 
violence.54 Regardless, the amount of suffering has been truly devastating. Now in 2020, with the 
Darfur conflict seeming to approach its end, it is necessary to develop an understanding of the 
conflict’s causal pathways in order to develop a capacity to prevent a similar tragedy in the 
future. Whether climate change could be a causal factor is an important question in developing 
such an understanding.  
With the evidence currently available, it cannot reasonably be concluded that the Darfur 
conflict was caused by climate change. What is evident, however, is that climate change has 
functioned as an intermediate variable. As an intermediate variable, climate change has not had 
any significant direct effect on the Darfur conflict, but it has indirectly affected the conflict by 
exacerbating other drivers, in this case: climate change-induced water scarcity/surplus, arable 
land scarcity/surplus, and internal population displacement. When considered in addition to the 
other causal pathways that led to the conflict, anthropogenic environmental degradation, ethnic 
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tensions, and government abuse, climate change as an intermediate variable intensified rather 
than caused the Darfur conflict.  
Evidence of Climate Change 
Declining Rainfall and Increasing Temperatures 
The evidence for the presence of climate change in Sudan, and Darfur specifically, is robust, 
being a subject of study since at least the late 1970s. Eldrege et al. argue that Sudan has 
experienced a statistically significant reduction in rainfall since 1966 in the important growing 
months of July, August, and September.55 While these are older findings, they are corroborated 
by a report published in 2011 by the United States Geological Service (USGS) in cooperation 
with USAID. The report finds that rainfall during summer months in Sudan’s western and 
southern regions have declined by ten to twenty percent.56 The United Nations Environmental 
Programme (UNEP) finds that this decline is irregular and most prominent in the regions of 
Kordofan and Darfur. In the province of North Darfur alone, precipitation has decreased by 30% 
over 80 years.57 UNEP also finds that air temperatures in Sudan have risen by more than one-
degree Celsius on average.58  
The decline in precipitation has in turn led to deforestation. Although much of Sudan’s 
deforestation can be attributed to human activity, the UNEP report finds that precipitation 
decline has pushed the outer limit of many tree species 50 to 200km southward.59 Combined, 
reduced precipitation and deforestation have contributed to another problem, desertification. The 
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report finds that the border between the semi-desert and the desert in Sudan has moved between 
50 to 200 kilometers southward since the 1930s.60 All three of these factors, reduced 
precipitation, deforestation, and desertification, have limited agricultural productivity, grazing 
potential for pastoral animals, and the water supply. As such, the factors outlined in these studies 
prove worrisome for Sudan’s food security. 
Climate Change-induced Droughts? 
Sudan’s increasingly precarious food security is further threatened by periodic droughts, 
but while there may seem to be a connection between declining rainfall and these droughts, they 
cannot be easily attributed to climate change. The Sahel region has increasingly been subject to 
varying precipitation levels from year to year.61 In Sudan this problem is especially acute as 
rainfall in the country varies between periods of little and heavy rainfall in a generally 
unpredictable fashion.62 In order to connect drought to climate change, it needs to be determined 
whether the frequency and severity of Sudan’s droughts have increased over time. As of writing, 
there have not been any robust studies linking Sudan’s droughts to climate change. Even in the 
UNEP report where drought and climate change are often mentioned in tandem, drought is 
treated as a separate entity from climate change and climate change-induced precipitation decline 
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Anthropogenic Environmental Degradation 
While there is support for the presence of climate change in Sudan and Darfur, it is 
important to recognize that other environmental changes may not be the result of climatic 
processes. Environmental degradation and the mismanagement of resources and land, for 
instance, is a large problem attributed to human activity. Writing in 1978, Ibrahim argues that 
this environmental degradation has accelerated the effects of desertification in western Sudan. 
According to Fouad, environmental degradation in western Sudan has taken many forms, 
including deforestation, overgrazing, excessive cultivation, poor water management, and 
irrigation projects.63 The evidence presented in the UNEP report supports Fouad’s argument, but 
at a broader regional scale.64 This environmental degradation component makes it even more 
difficult to distinguish between climate change and human activity. Both the evidence and the 
nonevidence of climate change should be recognized before moving forward to the connections 
between conflict and climate change in Darfur. 
Discussion 
Climate change in Sudan and Darfur has clearly had significant effects on the 
environment, but there are some problems to consider. While there is a large amount of evidence 
to suggest that Rainfall is slowly declining across the country and has been for decades, the 
evidence for temperature increase is more limited. Secondly, I could not find any studies 
scientifically connecting Sudan’s droughts to climate change, meaning I cannot prove they are 
related, only suggest a connection. Despite this, it is clear climate change is having significant 
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effects on the environment with increasing desertification and deforestation. It is necessary to 
understand, however, that some of this desertification and deforestation is not due to climate 
change but to anthropogenic environmental degradation caused by resource mismanagement and 
overexploitation. This makes it more difficult to distinguish the effects of climate change from 
other forms of human activity. With the information presented in this section, I can conclude that 
climate change has had an impact on Darfur by decreasing rainfall levels and accelerating 
desertification and deforestation, but I cannot connect climate change to Sudan’s droughts. 
Climate Change to Conflict 
Conflict between Arab and African tribes in Darfur has not been typical for the majority of the 
20th century. What then, could have caused the devastating conflict between the two groups that 
began in 2003? There are two possible culprits here. The first is climate change. As evidenced in 
the previous section, climate change has jeopardized the availability of water and arable land in 
both the northern and southern regions of Darfur. Evidence shows that the scarcity of these two 
resources have accelerated the migration of pastoral Arab tribes to the south. If the scarcity of 
these resources and the accelerating migration of Arab tribes are linked to conflict, then it can be 
argued that climate change has contributed. The other, is that the Arab-supremacist Sudanese 
government of Omar al-Bashir that emerged in 1989 has had a role to play in enabling the 
conflict. There is evidence to support both of these arguments, but as I will argue both cannot be 
considered causative factors. Rather, climate change functioned as an intermediate variable as an 





A History of Migration 
Table 3.1 shows that the conflicts 
between African tribal groups in 
Southern Darfur since the beginning 
of the 19th century have often 
occurred over water and grazing 
rights. The table also suggests the 
occurrence rate of these conflicts 
have been increasing. This 
increasing rate could be attributed to 
the increasing effects of climate 
change on Darfur which have 
increased resource strain in the 
region. Conflict between Africans 
and Arabs, however, has not been 
common. In fact, the first documented conflict between an African tribe and the Northern Arabs 
was in 1989, when Arabs and the Fur competed over “grazing and cross-boundary politics.” 
From 1989 to 2000, there have been four conflicts between Arabs and African tribes, one in 
1994, two separate conflicts in 1996, and one in 2000. Each conflict, although different in nature, 
has been over grazing and water and land rights to some extent. The 2003 conflict is a 
continuation of this trend but with a considerably larger scale and scope. 
Source: UNEP (2011), 82. 
Table 3.1 Conflict in Darfur (1930-2000) 
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The migration of northern pastoral groups to the south of Darfur is not a new 
phenomenon nor dependent on the presence of climate change. On the contrary, the migration of 
Arab nomadic tribes to the south is a common occurrence with a regular annual schedule. During 
dryer periods, the Sahara expands to vulnerable grazing land in the north. In response, Arab 
pastoral groups migrate south to find more suitable land for their herds.65 The migration occurs 
during the dryer parts of years as well as during times of abnormal aridity.66   
 
 
65 Alvarez, Unstable Ground: Climate Change, Conflict, and Genocide,” 110. 
66 United Nations Environment Programme, Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, 186. 
Figure 3.2 Seasonal Pastoral Migration Routes in Darfur  
Source: UNEP (2011), 188. 




These migrations are usually tolerated by African agricultural communities in the wetter 
south, but when the scale and duration of the migration increase, competition between the groups 
often occur for increasingly scarce land and water resources.67 As evidenced by the conflicts 
emerging from the drought of the 1980s, competition is exacerbated when Southern Darfur is 
also going through a period of dryness.     
Clearly, the relationship between water, arable land, and the displacement of peoples are 
all related in this case. The forces of climate change caused an increasing lack of water and 
arable land in northern Darfur. This pressured Arab pastoral groups to migrate to the wetter 
south. The pastoralists, without the ability for their herds to graze, encroached on settled 
cropland for food and water,68 which led to competition with the African agriculturalists, who 
themselves were struggling with food and water supplies. This competition exacerbated existing 
tensions in the region, making the environment more prone to violent conflict. Ultimately, this 
competition would contribute to the 2003 Darfur conflict.  
Some scholars have questioned the veracity of the connection of the scarcity of water and 
arable land to conflict in Darfur. In a 2008 study, Kevane and Gray argue that there was no 
noticeable decline in precipitation in Darfur in the years prior to the 2003 conflict and thus no 
connection between the scarcity of water and conflict69 Brown’s 2010 study supports this 
argument. He observes an increase in vegetation cover from 1981 to 2006 in Western and 
Northern Darfur, suggesting that there is no relationship, or perhaps a negative relationship 
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between vegetation cover and conflict.70 In contrast, de Juan 2014 argues that in regions with an 
increased availability of water and vegetation, conflict is both more likely and intense.71 Selby 
and Hoffmann 2013 also find evidence for a connection between the abundance of water and 
conflict in Sudan.72 How do we make sense of this? There are a few possibilities. The first is that 
the presence or scarcity of water or vegetation is not a good predictor of conflict. The second is 
that areas of water abundance could be perceived by the belligerents of the conflict as valuable 
pieces of land worth fighting over. Lastly and most convincingly, there may be another non-
environmental force at work that is enabling the conflict. 
Discussion 
This leaves a confusing picture of the impacts of climate change on the Darfur conflict. 
There is a large amount of evidence which suggests that climate change taking the form of 
desertification and water scarcity led to an increased migration of pastoral Arab nomadic groups 
to southern Darfur where they encroached on the land of African agriculturalists. Meanwhile, a 
smaller body of evidence suggests that the scarcity of water and arable land may have no 
connection to the conflict, and that it is the abundance of those resources that have a connection. 
The migration component of the conflict is clear and well-supported, but the degree to which the 
conflict between the Arabs and Africans is over the scarcity of water and arable land is in doubt. 
It is evident that climate change interacted with different variables connected to conflict to 
different degrees, operating as an intermediate variable. In this case, the effects of climate 
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change led to migration, which in turn led to the competition for water and arable land. This 
competition whether it was over a scarcity or an abundance of water and land resources, led to 
conflict between the African agriculturalists and Arab nomads. 
The Role of Other Factors 
If climate change is not the prerequisite for the Darfur conflict, then what is? Here it is necessary 
to examine the origins of the conflict more closely. There are three causal pathways to consider 
here. The first two deal with the influence of the government. The first causal pathway is the lack 
of institutional infrastructure and government mediation of conflicts in tribal lands. Without the 
necessary infrastructure and government mediatory presence, tribes felt justified to resolve 
conflicts extrajudicially. The second is the distribution of wealth in Sudan. The wealth of the 
Sudanese government came mostly from oil extraction and was not equally distributed among 
the many disparate regions and ethnicities of Sudan. One area that was left out was Darfur and 
the Africans who lived there. The third causal pathway takes the form of the ethnic tensions 
between Arabs and Africans, and the role of the Sudanese government in exacerbating them. 
The Role of the Government 
 During the 1970s, the Sudanese government under Jafaar al-Nimeiry reworked the many 
local tribal administrations within Sudan to have them operate under the Sudanese government. 
His government ended rule by local chiefs and broke up local tribal courts.73 By the time, Omar 
al-Bashir took power and instituted his National Islamic Front government, the traditional way 
for tribes to manage their territory and arbitrate disputes was already significantly disrupted, 
causing a great amount of confusion.74 To make matters worse, the Sudanese government did not 
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put in place adequate legal and judicial infrastructure in tribal regions to replace what was lost.75 
When conflicts over water and land among tribes in Darfur emerged, there was no government-
sanctioned legal remedy. The only way to resolve these conflicts was through extrajudicial 
violence.76 Because of this, there was no way for the Sudanese government to mediate the 
conflict before it began. 
 The second thing to consider is the economy and distribution of wealth within Sudan. 
The economy of Sudan is primarily agricultural, with about 80% of the workforce in agricultural 
jobs.77 Since the 1990s, however, the Government of Sudan has prioritized the extraction of oil 
for its income. The result of this focus on oil exports has made Sudan one of the fastest growing 
economies in Africa.78 The distribution of this wealth, however, has not been equal. The failure 
to invest some of this wealth into regions occupied by Africans in Darfur was a major 
contributing factor why African rebels took up arms against the Sudanese government.79 
Webersik argues that the dependence on oil exports and the unequal distribution of wealth has 
enabled conflict across Sudan.80 The Sudanese Government operates as a sort of rentier state. Its 
dependence on natural resources (i.e. oil) means it does not need to be accountable to the public 
as they are not being taxed and it does not offer as many public goods compared to other states 
with more robust and equitable economies.81 Further, the oil economy allows the Sudanese 
government the financial resources necessary to “start or sustain conflicts.”82 Without the need 
for tax contributions, the Arab-supremacist government of al-Bashir could safely combat its own 
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citizens without economic consequences. In this case, the citizens that al-Bashir targeted were 
the African natives of Darfur. 
Factionalism 
The final piece of this puzzle is the ethnic dimension of the conflict. As explained 
previously, the nomadic pastoral groups native to the north of Darfur consider themselves to be 
“Arab,” while the agriculturalists to the south consider themselves to be “African.” This ethnic 
divide, however, is superficial at best. In reality, both of these groups, no matter their asserted 
identities, are Africans.83 The distinction is political, not ethnic. There is also no apparent 
sectarian divide as both groups are Muslim, but it is important to note that both groups adhere to 
different cultural traditions.84 Despite this, a narrative has emerged in Western media of the 
importance of this ethnic dimension. Many scholars have criticized this narrative when 
approached in isolation, but when in combination with other factors, this dynamic has had a 
significant impact in prolonging the conflict.  
With all three of these pieces in mind, a picture of the government’s role in the conflict 
can be formed. Since al-Bashir took power, African Darfurians have rightly accused him and his 
National Islamic Front regime for favoring Arabs during disputes over water and land.85 In 2000, 
parts of The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan were published and 
distributed among Africans in Darfur.86 The document revealed the extent to which the National 
Islamic Front and its officials were corrupt and how Darfur was being ignored as a target of 
government investment. Although the book was directed at a broader audience of Sudanese 
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Africans, it resonated especially with Darfurian Africans who felt marginalized when compared 
to their Arab peers. The distribution of the book accelerated African-led rebel movements that 
protested the treatment of Africans in Darfur. These rebel groups soon began to target military 
installations in Darfur. The Sudanese government, fearful that a conflict in Darfur would 
resemble the intractable conflict in South Sudan, recruited local Arab tribesman to put down the 
rebels. Instead of focusing on just the rebels, however, the government and Arab militias, 
including the notorious Janjiweed, attacked civilian targets. They engaged in a terrifying 
campaign of ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and the indiscriminate destruction of African villages. 
Alvarez writes that many Arab tribesman participated in the Sudanese Government’s campaign 
of ethnic cleansing because of the struggle for land and water onset by climate change. By 
eliminating African villages and their inhabitants, Arabs could acquire water and arable land for 
themselves and their herds. Their “genocidal impulse” came not from hate but from competition 
over resources.87 
Discussion 
Both the government and factionalism had large roles to play in the Darfur Conflict, and to a 
larger degree than climate change, but would the conflict still have originated without the 
influence of climate change? I would argue yes. Although the climate change-intensified 
migration of Arab tribes led to violence between the two groups, it was the influence of the 
government and their support of the Janjiweed that turned small skirmishes into large-scale 
organized violence. It is important to recognize these two factors, as without them the conflict 
would not have become as big as it did. Climate change’s influence as an intermediate variable 
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intensified the conflict by increasing migration to the region, exacerbating tensions between the 
two groups. 
Conclusion 
The evidence gathered in this case presents a complicated picture of the causal pathways behind 
the Darfur conflict. It is clear that climate change played a role, but is that role insignificant 
when compared to the role of the government? I argue that the role played by climate change is 
that of an intermediate variable. Climate change affected three factors that contributed to 
conflict: the availability of water, the availability of arable land, and the displacement of peoples. 
In this case, all three of these factors are linked to each other. The lack of water and arable land 
drove Arab nomadic groups to southern Darfur in great numbers, causing competition over 
increasingly scarce resources stemming from population stresses and the effects of climate 
change. 
The role of the government is also important here. The failure of the government to 
administrate Darfur and invest in its African population led to the formation of rebel African 
groups. In order to combat these groups, the Sudanese Government financed and supplied Arab 
militias that engaged in a campaign of geocide against the African civilian population. Arabs 
were encouraged to participate in the conflict to acquire water and arable land that was becoming 
increasingly scarce as a result of climate change. Many cite ethnic tensions between Africans and 
Arabs as another factor behind the conflict. The evidence suggests, however, that the conflict 
was in reality a political and economic one. The extermination of “undesirable” Africans in favor 
of the Arab nomadic population was more of a crime of opportunity for the Sudanese 
Government, than the primary driver behind the conflict. It is unclear if the Arab tribesman 
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would have participated in the conflict without the competition over resources caused by climate 
change.   
The evidence in this case suggest that both climate change-linked factors and non-climate 
change-linked factors have had a contributing role to play in the conflict. The question is whether 
the conflict would have occurred with just one group of factors. I argue that conflict would be 
unlikely to occur when just considering climate change. While competition for land and water 
may have led to some conflict, most of it would be small-scale skirmishes. The influence of the 
government and their support of militia groups was the primary driver for a violent, large-scale, 
and organized campaign of violence between the Africans and Arabs. Therefore, while climate 
















In the late 2000s, Syria experienced a severe and unprecedented drought. The exact time range of 
the drought is disputed, beginning in either 2006 or 2007 and ending in either 2008 or 2009,88 
and some even claim the drought reemerged in 2011.89 Therefore, this thesis will refer to the 
drought hereafter as the late 2000s drought. Regardless of its duration, the drought had severe 
impacts on the livelihoods of millions of people in Syria, especially in the northeast of the 
country, home to much of Syria’s agricultural base.90 The effects of the drought were too much 
for many rural Syrians, and upwards of 60,000 families91 migrated to nearby cities to seek 
employment and better living conditions. The mass migration coupled with severe economic 
problems and mismanagement by the Assad regime led to unrest among many city dwellers. The 
initially peaceful protests were suppressed violently by the Syrian Government, ultimately 
leading to the organization of rebel groups and the beginning of the Syrian Civil War.  
Some scholars have attempted to link the late 2000s drought to climate change, but this is 
a difficult task. There is evidence of declining rainfall and increasing temperatures over a period 
of decades in Syria, although some of the evidence remains disputed. This is not enough to prove 
that the drought was caused by climate change, but the unprecedented severity and length of the 
drought suggests that climate change has at least intensified the drought. While scholars debate 
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the causes of the drought and the extent to which climate change has impacted Syria, there is 
widespread consensus among ordinary Syrians that climate change is negatively affecting their 
livelihoods.92 
Despite the ambiguity, policymakers across the globe were quick to connect the conflict to 
climate change in a strikingly similar fashion to the Darfur crisis. In the United States, President 
Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, Governor Martin O’Malley, and Senator Bernie Sanders 
have all made remarks connecting climate change and the late 2000s drought to the unrest in 
Syria that led to the civil war.93 Similar remarks have been made by international organizations 
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Figure 4.1 Map of Syria (northeast region highlighted) 
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such as the United Nations, Governmental Bodies, NGOs, think tanks, and activists.94 including 
the Syrian representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) who described the 
drought as a “‘perfect storm’” in combination with Syria’s economic stressors in inciting 
unrest.95 Often, the term “threat multiplier” is used by policy makers, such as by the CNA 
Military Advisory Board, suggesting that climate change increased the propensity for conflict in 
Syria.96  
Climate change and the late 2000s drought does not tell the whole story, however. It is also 
necessary to consider the role of the Syrian government, and in order to understand that some 
more context must be presented. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad took power in a coup in Syria. Coming 
from a rural background, he focused development efforts on rural areas and agriculture, and 
brought education, water, and electricity to the rest of the country.97 Despite these positive 
developments, his regime was marked by violent crackdowns and corruption.98 After al-Assad’s 
death in 2000, his son, Bashar al-Assad took power. Despite initially signaling willingness to 
reform, Bashar generally maintained the status quo, but did take steps to liberalize and diversify 
the economy. He shifted focus away from the rural areas his father prioritized toward urban 
centers, in order to diversify the economy and develop a more mature service sector.99 
The rapid liberalization of Syria’s economy came at a cost. During the drought of the late 
2000s, many of the rural areas deprioritized by Bashar al-Assad’s regime suffered. In March of 
2011, protests erupted in Dar’a, a city in a poor agricultural region in the south of the country, 
over government corruption and abuse in addition to the failures of the regime to address 
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economic woes felt by ordinary people. These protests, inspired by the success of the Arab 
Spring in Tunisia and Egypt, were brutally repressed and soon spread to nearby cities. These 
protests and frustrations throughout the country would eventually erupt into the Syrian Civil 
War.  
The Syrian Civil War is much more well known in the West than the Darfur Conflict, 
dominating news headlines for much of the early 2010s. A truly devastating conflict, it has led 
approximately 5.6 million refugees to leave the country, 6.2 million people to be displaced 
internally within Syria, and at least 560,000 people dead.100 Despite diminishing news coverage, 
the conflict is still ongoing in 2020, and the dimensions of the conflict continue to evolve. The 
complexity and dynamic nature of the conflict make it difficult to provide an overview of the 
evolution conflict. Instead this chapter will focus on how climate change may have had an 
impact on the conflict’s origins.  
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that climate change has operated as an 
intermediate variable in this case. Instead of a direct connection between climate change and 
conflict, climate change influenced conflict by interacting with a suite of other variables that are 
widely believed to be connected to the conflict, in this case: migration, poor rural and water 
infrastructure, and urban pressures. The influence of climate change was not mediated 
significantly by other factors because of the weakness of the Syrian economy and failures of the 
state to address these economic woes and a poor water infrastructure network.  
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Evidence of Climate Change 
Declining Rainfall and Increasing Temperature 
When compared to the Darfur case, the evidence for climate change in Syria is more limited, but 
there has been increasing study within recent years. The late-2000s drought has been of special 
interest to many researchers. In a 2018 study of gauging stations across Syria, Alkhalaf et al. 
reported a noticeable downward trend of seasonal rainfall during the from 1991 to 2009 in 
regions across the country.101 In some regions, however, seasonal rainfall, especially during the 
dry seasons increased.102 These inconsistencies may be a product of the limited time frame of the 
study, but it is more likely due to the climatic variations across the country. The severity of the 
drought is highlighted within by the figure below which shows that a large majority of cities 
throughout the country experienced negative rainfall anomalies from 2006/07 to 2008/09. Figure 
4.2 shows that Aleppo had the highest positive anomaly with 18%, Lattakia had the lowest 
negative anomaly with -1% and Al-Rakka had the highest negative anomaly with -36%.103 
Regardless of any contradiction, any change in the norm can prove disruptive to people’s 
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Temperature increase, however, has been consistent in its upward trend throughout Syria. 
In a study of the Middle East region at large, Jallo found that temperature has been increasing by 
0.0036°C per year.104  This trend is consistent and seems to correlate with the increasing levels 
of carbon dioxide atmospheric concentration. These findings are corroborated by Waha et al. 
who note that the average temperature in MENA has increased by 0.2°C every decade from 1961 
to 1990, and this rate has since accelerated.105 This is a significant increase for a thirty-year 
period. Waha et al.’s study had a larger scope than Jallo, including North Africa in the analysis, 
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Figure 4.2 Rainfall Anomalies in Syria (2006/7 to 2008/09) 




so these findings can be difficult to compare. Even so, these studies show a significant increasing 
temperature trend throughout the Middle East. If the average annual temperature in the Middle 
East has increased, surely it would have increased in Syria as well. This assumption is verified to 
a limited extent by Lelieveld et al. who find that the temperature in Damascus has increased by 
.4°C every decade since 1951.106 Syria is a country with varying climates, so a temperature 
anomaly in one city in one region is not too telling. There needs to be more research on annual 
rainfall and temperature in Syria at a country rather than regional scale. Kelley et al., hereafter 
K2015, however, believe that there is enough evidence within the literature to support the 
argument “that [these] long term trends in precipitation and temperature [in Syria] are a 
consequence of human interference with the climate system.”107 
 Another important source is the perception of the Syrian people of the effects of climate 
change. Of course, this information is not as reputable as statistical studies and may be based on 
inaccurate assessments or personal biases. Still, these perceptions can inform us of changes that 
statistical studies may have missed or not have thoroughly studied. The comprehensive 2014 
World Bank report on climate change and migration in MENA provides a comprehensive view 
of the perceptions of climate change across Syria. In a survey conducted in 2011, the World 
Bank found that an overwhelming percentage of Syrians, 99.6% said that they have noticed 
rainfall to be more erratic, and all Syrian respondents said that the rainy seasons starts later, ends 
earlier, and is shorter.108 They have also noticed more frequent droughts. This study suggests a 
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consensus among Syrian households that climate change is affecting the country, primarily 
through an increase in temperature and a decrease in rainfall. This survey data does not prove the 
presence of climate change in Syria but such an overwhelming consensus in climate change 





Figure 4.3 Perceptions of Climate Change among Syrians (Percent) 
Source: Wodon et al. (2014), 9. 
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A Climate Change-intensified Drought 
The late 2000s drought is likely reflected in the responses to the 2011 World Bank 
survey. This drought had a significant effect on the northeast of Syria, a major agricultural 
region, because of its extended length and severity. According to K2015 this drought is 
unprecedented in its scope and impact. Could the severe nature of the drought then mean it could 
be attributed to climate change? In the previous chapter on Darfur, I warned about the use of 
drought as such a measure because of its unpredictable nature. K2015 argue, however, that the 
unprecedented length and severity of the drought are unmistakably attributed to climate change. 
They write that, “[m]ultiyear droughts occur periodically in the [Fertile Crescent] due to natural 
causes, but it is unlikely that the recent drought would have been as extreme absent the century-
long drying trend.” 109 They conclude that the drought would not have been as severe if not for 
these temperature and rainfall trends. Cook et al. reach a similar conclusion. According to their 
model, there is a 98% chance that 1989 to 2012 was the driest fifteen-year period since 1500 
C.E.110 It is possible that this is an especially severe anomaly of course, but the research suggests 
that the Syrian drought of the late 2000s was caused or at least exacerbated by climate change.  
This is not to say there has not been criticism of this claim. As many have noted, 
“drought is not an exceptional phenomenon” in Syria.111 In a 2017 article by Selby et al., 
“Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited,” hereafter S2017, the authors are highly 
critical of the K2015 study which argued that the late 2000s Syrian drought is undeniably 
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attributed to climate change. They criticize K2015 for making specific claims about Syria when 
their study broadly covers the “Fertile Crescent” region.112 They also point to the fact that many 
studies use different time frames for the duration of the drought. K2015, for instance, refer to the 
drought lasting different periods of time throughout the paper.113 These first two criticisms are 
fair. It is not appropriate to make specific claims about one country in a regional study, and the 
length of the drought should be held consistent.  S2017’s next claim, however, is not as 
adequately supported. They argue that there is not enough evidence for “multi-decadal drying 
either in the Fertile Crescent region as a whole, or in northeast Syria, specifically.”114 This claim 
is refuted by much of the literature already covered, and this article seems to be an outlier in this 
regard. Even if there is not enough evidence for a multi-decadal drying trend, the unusual 
severity of the drought should still be considered as a possible consequence of climate change.  
S2017 received some significant pushback for the arguments laid out in their article. In a 
response to the critique they received in the article, Kelley et al. wrote that they found nothing to 
refute the argument that climate change played a contributing role in the conflict within S2017. 
They disagree that there is no evidence of a multidecadal drying trend, and argue that the Syrian 
drought of the late 2000s is consistent with models of anthropogenic climate change, and the 
findings presented in the general literature.115 They also argue that the chance of eight out of 
twelve of their monitoring stations showing evidence of drying is less than one in eight.116 
Gleick, whose 2014 article was similar to K2015’s in its argument and was also criticized by 
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S2017, replied to the article as well, arguing that S2017 ignored the influence of temperature, 
which also has a drying influence, in their definition of the drought.117 Selby et al. responded to 
both of these criticisms in a short rejoinder. They argue that the question at issue here is not 
whether climate change had an impact on the Syrian drought, it is the extent to which climate 
change affected the drought, which they believe to be very little, and they find that such 
influence would be impossible to prove.118  
Discussion 
When compared to the evidence for Darfur the evidence of climate change’s effects in 
Syria is more limited. The body of literature generally focusses on drying trends in the region 
and the late-2000s Syrian drought. Future sources should expand their scope and consider other 
timeframes and elements of climate change in Syria. Furthermore, many of the works that do 
have information on Syria only give the country a cursory glance within a larger study of the 
region. The World Bank study is useful here because it suggests that the effects of climate 
change in Syria may be underappreciated by scholars. There is near universal consensus among 
Syrian respondents that the country is becoming hotter and dryer. Such a consensus suggests that 
more attention should be given to studying the effects of climate change in Syria specifically. 
With the limited information presented in this section, I can conclude that climate change has 
had an impact on Syria, and that the drought was intensified by climate change, but the other 
degrees to which climate change has affected the country remains uncertain. 
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Climate Change to Conflict 
As with Darfur, it is impossible to connect climate change to the Syrian Civil War directly. 
Instead, climate change functioned as an intermediate variable, interacting with other factors 
known to cause the conflict, and with its influence mediated by the present socioeconomic 
conditions in Syria. The causal pathway from climate change to conflict in Syria within the 
literature is often presented in three parts. Climate change to drought, drought to migration, and 
migration to conflict.119 The question of whether climate change caused the drought remains a 
contested debate, but the literature presented within the last section seems to present a clear 
picture that it at least exacerbated the severity and length of the drought. By intensifying the late 
2000s drought, climate change indirectly led to conflict in Syria by affecting the livelihoods of 
rural people, causing them to migrate to cities. Demographic and economic pressures manifested 
as complaints against the state, inciting protests and the subsequent government crackdown and 
civil war.   
The Effects of the Drought  
The drought caused a mass disruption of agriculture within Syria. Many countries within 
MENA rely on agriculture for income and food and this is especially true for Syria. 120 
Agriculture is a large part of the Syrian economy, with 40% of workers being represented in the 
industry.121 Agriculture makes up a large part of Syria’s land as well. 44% of Syrians live in rural 
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areas,122 and a third of the land in Syria is cultivated.123 With this significant dependence on 
agriculture for the economy and the livelihoods of over a third of its population, Syria is 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of drought.  
This vulnerability is compounded by Syria’s poor water resources and infrastructure. 
With less than 1% of its water supplies composed of freshwater, Syria faces significant water 
stress.124 Agriculture is responsible for 90% of water usage.125 Considering that 30% of Syria’s 
land is irrigated,126 a lack of water resources would significantly affect agricultural production. 
Furthermore, 75% of Syria’s crops are dependent on rainfall, meaning that any significant drop 
in annual precipitation would be devastating.127  
 The late 2000s drought had profound impacts on the Syrian people and caused a massive 
decline in wheat production in northeastern Syria.128 1.3 million Syrians were severely affected 
by the drought and around 800,000 “lost their entire livelihood, with small-scale farmers and 
herders being particularly affected.”129 After an especially poor harvest between 2007 and 2008, 
Syria had to import wheat for the first time in fifteen years.130 The severe drop in food 
production led to malnutrition and disease for many Syrians affected by the drought.131  The 
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United Nations estimated that in 2010, 3.7 million Syrians would be food insecure as a result of 
the drought.132 Husbandry was affected too; 85% of local livestock in the region were lost.133 
The 2011 World Bank survey is particularly illuminating on the effects of the drought on 
people’s lives. According to the report, around 20% of Syrian respondents lost income, 87% lost 
crops, and 17% lost livestock due to environmental change.134 This change is not specified to be 
from the drought, but the statistics from the report in the previous section on Syrians’ perceptions 
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Figure 4.4 Percentage of Syrians who Suffered Economic Consequences from Climate Change 




 These economic hardships were so severe that many rural Syrians chose to migrate. 
85.25% of Syrian respondents in the 2011 World Bank survey reported that some people had to 
leave their households in order to cope, only 2.63% of respondents reported they had people 
move in.136 160 villages in the northeast of Syria were abandoned.137 Of all migrant respondents, 
14.9% reported the need to escape drought as their first reason to migrate, and 13.17% reported it 
their second reason.138 When combined, 28.07% of migrant respondents reported drought as a 
reason to migrate. The more significant concern expressed in the survey, however, was 
employment. 41.47% reported migrating to pursue employment as their first reason, and 16.41% 
reported it was their second (57.88% combined). 27% reported migrating because of a lack of 
employment at their point of origin as their first reason, and 41.47% reported it as their second 
(68.47% combined).139 While employment was a larger concern among migrants, there was still 
a significant proportion (i.e. 28.07%), who cited the need to escape drought.  
 The migration numbers within Syria during the time of the drought are under debate. 
Gleick writes that 1.5 million people migrated to cities and camps around cities such as Aleppo, 
Damascus, Dar’a, and Deir ez-Zour, but he does not specify the timeframe nor a source for this 
number.140 This thesis will coopt the United Nations estimate that 29,000-30,000 families 
migrated in 2009, and 50,000 migrated in 2010 (79,000-80,000 in total).141 In addition to the 
internally displaced Syrians and a large urban growth rate of around 2.5% a year, there were also 
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between 1.2 to 1.5 million Iraqi refugees who escaped the Iraq War from 2003 to 2007.142 With 
all of these factors considered, the urban population in Syria increased from 8.9 million in 2002 
to 13.8 million in 2010,143 a 55% increase in just 8 years. These numbers are significant, but also 
include some years before the drought began, i.e. 2002-2005. This could mean that in addition to 
the mass immigration of Iraqi refugees there is an economic trend unrelated to the drought that 
was driving some of this migration such as the lack of employment opportunities in rural areas. 
Migration to Conflict 
  According to Reuveny, when a large number of migrants come to cities it may cause 
economic and demographic pressures leading to conflict.144 The mass migration to urban areas 
put pressure onto cities who were already burdened by poor governance and economic 
hardships.145 Many, but not all, of these migrants were displaced by the drought and were 
seeking employment opportunities. Making matters worse, migrants often lived in poor 
conditions and had trouble acquiring work. According to Feitelson and Tubi, "[m]any of the 
migrants settled in illegal tent camps with limited access to infrastructure. Facing high rates of 
unemployment and receiving little or no aid from the Syrian Government, these cities and towns 
became the center of the developing unrest and the seedbeds of the Syrian civil war.”146 The 
unrest was not expressed between the locals and the migrants like in the Darfur case, rather the 
unrest was targeted at the al-Assad regime.  
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There were smaller protests in other major cities against the Syrian government, but the 
first major protest, and the catalyst that began the road to civil war, was in Dar’a.147 Dar’a is a 
city in a poor agricultural region in the south of Syria. The Dar’a governorate was severely 
affected by the drought and many Syrians fled the region’s countryside to seek employment in 
the main city.148 Driven by government abuse, corruption, and mismanagement of water 
resources, peaceful protest movements began in the city.149 Many of the protestors, specifically 
young men, were particularly upset by the government’s response to the drought and desired 
radical change to a government that was failing them.150The government responded harshly, only 
fomenting more dissent among the protestors. Soon after, the protests in Dar’a would spread to 
other cities in Syria, beginning a rapid descent into civil war.  
Discussion 
It is already clear from this section that the drought does not provide a full picture of the origins 
of the conflict. For one, the drought also affected other countries in the region “such as Iraq, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine, and Iraq,” but these countries did not see conflict nor 
mass migration stemming from the drought.151 Although, the drought did lead many Syrians to 
migrate, it was not the primary reason for the majority of migrants; it was the search for 
employment that drove most to migrate. In addition, the responses to the 2011 World Bank 
survey do not suggest that the drought led to significant conflict for water or land like in Darfur. 
Only 0.38% of respondents reported conflict over land and livestock, and 1% over water.152 And 
in the cities, conflict did not emerge between the original denizens and the migrants, it emerged 
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between an increasingly disgruntled populace and the government. In order to proceed, it will be 
necessary to consider how other non-climate change factors influenced the conflict. From the 
information presented in this section alone, there is not enough evidence that climate change was 
a major contributor, but perhaps it interacted with other variables in some way to bring about the 
conflict.  
The Role of Other Factors 
Climate change does not provide the full picture for the conflict. The drought may have led some 
Syrians to migrate, but the grievances they expressed in their protests were not exclusively 
related to the drought. Here, climate change functioned as an intermediate variable, interacting 
with other factors present in Syria at the time to make a poor economic situation even worse. 
Mediating factors that would limit climate change and the drought’s effects such as the strength 
of the government and economy did not have a strong effect. In this case, climate change had a 
stronger effect than it would have in countries with a more stable economy and political 
environment such as in Turkey. 
Poor Rural and Water Infrastructure  
The first factor to consider is the role of deteriorating rural and water infrastructure in the 
regions affected by the drought. Notably, there were precarious conditions in these regions even 
before the drought. The northeast of Syria, the region most severely affected by the drought, was 
impoverished with diminishing water resources.153 This was the result of poor planning by the 
government and a profligate use of water for agriculture. The al-Assad regime pursued ambitious 
waterworks projects to expand the irrigation potential of Syria’s agricultural regions. The 
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northeast, the “breadbasket” of Syria and a source of oil, was a favored target of these state 
development projects.154  
The Syrian government chose to pursue these projects not to the benefit of the local 
populace. Instead, it sought opportunities to profit in the short-term while risking water security 
in the long term.155 This came at a significant cost to rural Syrians. According to Ward and 
Rucksthul, as a result of state irrigation projects, “agricultural value added rose by 9 [percent] 
[between 2001 and 2007], but agricultural employment dropped by a third.”156 Further they find 
that “half a million jobs were lost in the agricultural sector over the same period, a reduction of 
10 [percent] of the total labor force.”157 The construction of the Tishrin Dam on the Euphrates 
river provides another example. Those living in the dam area were forced to leave their homes in 
1999 and migrate to the nearby city of Damascus and its surroundings, instilling anti-sentiment 
government in those displaced.158 The livelihoods of rural people further deteriorated after the 
cancellation of food and fuel subsidies in 2005, raising agricultural costs, unemployment, and 
food insecurity.159 This was part of the effort to liberalize Syria’s economy and transition priority 
to the service sector.160 
Despite all these irrigation projects, Syria was facing a water shortage problem even 
before the drought. Many aquifers across the country had been quickly exhausted, including one 
of the largest karst springs in the world, the Ras al-Ain springs on the border with Turkey in 
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2001.161 Syria’s water network provided 19.2 billion cubic meters of water a year, but the 
renewable supply was only 15.2 billion cubic meters.162 Syria’s eastern steppe has also been also 
subject to desertification because of overgrazing, the result of the collapse of traditional pastoral 
practices following the nationalization of the steppe in 1958.163And despite all of these irrigation 
measures, much of the country still relied on traditional and unpredictable flood irrigation.164 As 
a result these largescale and wasteful development projects found themselves significantly 
strained during the late 2000s drought. The government originally ignored the water crisis, but 
soon turned to the United Nations for aid but received very little.165 The al-Assad regime would 
soon blame climate change in an effort to relieve themselves of responsibility, and they did not 
take significant steps to alleviate the situation.166 Even if the Syrian government did intervene, 
however, it would have likely been for naught, as it could not mitigate the damage of the drought 
with the water supply so stressed. Without the possibility of mitigation, those severely affected 
by the drought had no choice but to migrate to cities in search for employment and food security.  
Urban Pressures 
The exact number of Syrians who fled to cities as a result of the drought is uncertain. In the 
S2017 article, Selby et al. argue that the displacement numbers are lower than the 1.5 million 
people claimed by some.167 The authors favor a United Nations estimate of 40,000-60,000 
families.168 It is difficult to compare the two figures, however, because the number of individuals 
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within each family is not specified. Even so, it is highly unlikely that the average rural Syrian 
family is composed of an average of 25 people.  
S2017 also claims that the dramatic economic changes in Syria as result of Bashar al-Assad’s 
liberalization campaign caused the mass migration to occur before the drought began.169 In 
addition to inflation and other economic woes, the end of essential subsidies, and the 
prioritization of urban development drove many rural Syrians to migrate to cities.170 Between 
2000 and 2005, approximately 135,000 rural Syrians migrated to cities each year.171 They also 
cite that seasonal migration occurred in large numbers before the drought, but it should be noted 
that temporary migration is not the same nor has the same economic effects as permanent 
migration. According to Selby et al., the drought may have exacerbated permanent migration, but 
not to a significant degree.172 
Even without an influx of migrants, Syria’s cities were facing severe problems. According to 
Abel et al., Syrian cities were experiencing, “[r]apid growing population, overcrowding, 
unemployment and increased inequality.”173 There was an increasing urban-rural divide, and 
Syria’s poor were unable to keep up given the economic liberalization and the corruption of the 
elite.174 These circumstances already provided a framework for discontent and anti-government 
sentiment. The pressures from migration would have intensified these frustrations, perhaps 
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 There is not too much to discuss when it comes to sectarian or ethnic factionalism as it 
seems to not have had a major effect on the origins of the conflict. Jody Peterson notes the long 
history of sectarian violence and divide in Syria as well as the al-Assad regime’s preferential 
treatment of the Alawites, a sect of Shi’a Islam which the al-Assad family belongs to.175 Syria is 
a majority Sunni country. Despite this, I did not encounter information within the literature on 
tensions between Iraqi refugees and Syrians, migrants and residents, or between religious groups 
that would catalyze conflict. There was, however, long standing resentment toward Alawites 
because many senior members of the Syrian government belonged to the sect, including the 
security forces chief of Dar’a at the time of the original protests.176 In this way, however, it was 
more of a class divide than a religious one, with poor Syrians against the elites of the Syrian 
government. Factionalism would play a much larger role as the conflict progressed into civil war 
with the splintering of rebel factions and the rise of the Islamic State, but it was not much of a 
factor before then. 
Another point of note regarding factionalism is that the northeast of Syria, where the 
drought hit the hardest, is home to the majority of Syria’s Kurdish population. Traditionally, the 
Kurds have been an oppressed minority within Syria and antagonistic to the al-Assad regime. 
They have been a prominent faction in the civil war with a fluctuating degree of control over 
Syria’s northeast. It is possible that Kurdish migrants to Syrian cities were responsible for some 
of the early unrest, expressing feelings that their plight was being ignored by the Syrian 
government. This could have fueled desire for an armed rebellion. 
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These factors in isolation, with the exception of factionalism, provide enough impetus for 
unrest in Syria even without climate change or a severe drought. The case illustrates how climate 
change is an intermediate factor that, under the right conditions, can expediate and intensify 
conflicts. While the conflict would have likely occurred without the drought, the number of 
migrants that the drought produced increased the number of people who were discontent with the 
Syrian government, exacerbating the unrest. There are also some other factors that played a role 
and should be considered. Jody Prescott notes the importance of social media as an organizing 
tool and the rhetorical and financial support of rebel groups by international actors.177 The 
context of the Arab Spring is important as well, as the protests may not have occurred if they 
were not inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt.  
Conclusion 
Compared to Darfur, the Syrian case is simpler in that the presence of climate change does not 
seem to be as important for the Syrian conflict, which would have still occurred even without the 
climate change-intensified drought.  It was the wasteful short-term water infrastructure planning 
of the Syrian government, mismanaged economic transition, and urban pressures that enabled the 
conflict. The presence of climate change and the drought only made these frustrations more 
intolerable, expediting and intensifying the early unrest. 
Bearing this in mind, it is evident that in this case climate change has functioned as an 
intermediate variable, interacting with the above factors and ultimately making each issue worse. 
The climate change-intensified drought exposed the faulty irrigation projects of the al-Assad 
regime and Syria’s water stress. Furthermore, the government’s failure to mitigate the drought 
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impoverished countless Syrians and drove them to migrate to cities. Meanwhile, the 
liberalization of the Syrian economy put priority on urban areas at the expense of necessary rural 
infrastructure, and urban pressures were heightened when the large numbers of rural Syrians 
affected by the drought arrived in cities, exacerbating the existing demographic and economic 
problems within Syria’s urban areas. Syria’s inadequate adaptability to the drought because of 
the government’s poor planning and the country’s economic woes meant that the effects of the 
climate change-intensified drought were not mediated. 
If conflict emerged at some point, even without the presence of climate change, it cannot 
be concluded that climate change was a threat multiplier for this case. Climate change did not 
increase the chance for conflict. It was bound to happen at some point; the ingredients for 
conflict were already present. Instead, climate change interacted with these ingredients, 











CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS 
  
This work has reviewed the effects of climate change on conflict through an analysis of two case 
studies, the Darfur Conflict and the Syrian Civil War. In this section, I will compare my findings 
from the two case studies in order to determine to what extent climate change operated as an 
intermediate variable. Furthermore, I will determine which factors played the most influential 
role in each case. I will argue that both of these cases would have still occurred without the 
presence of climate change. The presence of climate change, only exacerbated the conflicts, 
making them more severe at onset. I will then discuss a few alternative explanations of the 
climate change-conflict relationship and explain how they are not applicable to these cases.  
Review 
In general, scholars have approached the climate change-conflict relationship in three ways. The 
first way is to treat climate change as having an indirect effect on conflict as a threat multiplier. 
Scholars who approach climate change as a threat multiplier argue that climate change can and 
will increase the propensity for conflict in vulnerable areas. A second approach is to dismiss the 
threat multiplier narrative while maintaining an indirect connection between climate change and 
conflict. These critical scholars argue that climate change only affects conflict when certain 
socioeconomic conditions are met such as high unemployment, existing ethnic tensions, and so 
on. The third approach is to doubt the significance of any relationship between climate change 
and conflict. These skeptical scholars do not deny that climate change may have an impact on 
conflict, but they believe the relationship to be insignificant or indeterminable. 
In my thesis, I have adopted a modified version of the critical approach, climate change 
as an intermediate variable. This is an idea adopted from Sakaguchi et al. and Feitelson and Tubi 
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that argues that climate change affects conflict through three different causal pathways: direct, 
interacting, and mediating.178 The only causal pathway pertinent to my cases studies was the 
interacting pathway. Through this pathway, climate change affected conflict indirectly through 
its influence on relevant independent variables such as economic factors or migration. Unlike the 
threat multiplier narrative, the intermediate variable framework suggests that climate change’s 
effects on conflict is not as significant compared to other factors, and that conflict is unlikely to 
occur with the presence of climate change in isolation.  
Case Study Findings 
Darfur 
The Sudan Darfur conflict provides only fair evidence for climate change as an intermediate 
variable. The conflict would have still occurred even without the presence of climate change. 
There are multiple factors to consider that may have contributed to the conflict including, climate 
change, shortages of water and arable land, anthropogenic environmental degradation, migration, 
government preference of Arab nomadic groups, and ethnic divisions between Arab and African 
tribes. Evidence for the presence of climate change within Darfur specifically, is fairly strong, 
but more research should be done. While there is evidence for decreasing rainfall, increasing 
temperatures, and accelerating desertification, there are no studies connecting climate change to 
the devastating droughts that precluded the conflict in Darfur. It should also be noted, however, 
that anthropogenic environmental degradation stemming from mismanagement and 
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overexploitation of land also contributed to desertification and a shortage of water and arable 
land. The environmental degradation did not act alone, however. Climate change made these 
existing problems much more severe. 
Climate change affected conflict indirectly through its influence on two factors, 
competition for water and arable land and migration. While climate change is not proven to have 
an effect on the drought that precluded the conflict, it surely made the effects of the drought 
more intolerable for the Arab nomads. Increasing temperatures, accelerating desertification, and 
decreasing rainfall was already presenting a challenge for both African and Arab tribes. In 
response to the drought, many African tribes were forced to migrate south to find water and 
favorable grazing land for their herds. This put them in conflict with the settled Arabs who were 
also finding water and arable land increasingly scarce. 
Unfortunately, climate change’s influence on the conflict could not be mediated. First, 
Darfur was already highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change because of its location in a 
semi-arid climate. Anthropogenic environmental degradation made the region even more 
vulnerable. Second, the Sudanese government did not have a significant presence in Darfur 
before the conflict. There were no legally sanctioned methods to resolve conflicts, only through 
tribal negotiation or conflict could problems be resolved.  
Regardless of the effects of climate change, the ensuing skirmishes between the Arabs 
and Africans would not evolve into the grand scale of the conflict involving genocidal campaigns 
and government-financed militia groups were climate change the only factor. It is also necessary 
to consider the role of the Arab-supremacist Sudanese government under Omar al-Bashir. The al-
Bashir regime refused to invest in the Darfur region because of its African population, despite 
the regime’s recent wealth from oil extraction. This caused discontent among Africans in the 
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region who felt they were being excluded in favor of the Arab population. This gave way to a 
factional dispute. The divide between Arabs and Africans in Darfur is not ethnic – it is political. 
After the publication of the Black Book, many Africans organized into rebel groups. In response, 
the government supported Arab militia groups, including the Janjiweed, and endorsed their 
campaign of ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and the destruction of villages. Arab militiamen did not 
participate in this campaign because of a hatred of Africans, however. The goal was to acquire 
the arable land and water the Africans once owned. 
 Figure 5.1 Interacting Causal Pathway to Conflict in Darfur 
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It is apparent that the conflict would have occurred without the presence of climate 
change. Settled Africans would eventually revolt against the oppressive al-Bashir regime that 
excluded them in favor of Arabs for economic investment and dispute resolution. This was the 
most influential factor that contributed to the onset of the conflict. Instead of causing the conflict, 
climate change exacerbated it by accelerating desertification and reducing rainfall leading to the 
permanent migration of Arab groups south. This increased the number of Arabs that could be 
recruited into pro-Arab militias, as well as the competition for resources that justified the 
destruction of villages.  
Syria 
Like Darfur, the Syrian Civil War also only provides fair evidence for climate change as 
an intermediate variable, and the conflict would have still occurred without the presence of 
climate change. In this case, the factors that may have contributed to the conflict include, climate 
change, environmental degradation, government mismanagement of water resources, economic 
woes, and migration. Evidence for the presence of climate change within Syria is only fair, but in 
contrast to Darfur, climate change’s connection to the drought has been demonstrated. Even still, 
the body of research remains small. More studies should be conducted on climate change in 
Syria specifically, instead of a Middle East or MENA regional context. Anthropogenic 
environmental degradation played a role as well, but mostly from government mismanagement 
of water resources, which will be discussed separately.  
Climate change affected conflict indirectly through its influence on two factors, 
compromised livelihoods, and as in Darfur, migration. The climate change-intensified drought 
had significant impacts on the livelihoods of many Syrians in rural regions, especially the 
northeast. Many Syrians had no choice but to migrate to urban areas in order to seek employment 
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and better living conditions. The mass migration of rural Syrians to Syria’s cities exacerbated 
economic pressures in urban areas such as mass unemployment, the result of failed liberalization 
policies. The failure of the government to address the drought and remedy the economy led many 
Syrians to believe the al-Assad regime had failed them, causing them to protest. These protests 
would be brutally suppressed by the regime. In response, rebel groups would form in armed 
opposition to the Syrian government.  
Like in Darfur, climate change’s influence on the conflict could not be mediated. This 
was because of the poor rural and water infrastructure implemented by the Syrian government. 
Water was already in short supply before the 
drought because of poor planning and 
overexploitation. The Syrian government could 
not alleviate the drought because of the water 
stress. As with Darfur, the presence of climate 
change was not necessary for the conflict to 
begin. There are many more factors to consider in 
this case, all of them related to government 
mismanagement of resources and the economy. 
Therefore, the most influential factor in this case 
was the role of the government. The al-Assad 
regime’s liberalization plans ushered in an 
economic downturn that would have surely lead 
Syrians in cities to revolt regardless of the climate 
change-intensified migration. There were already 
Figure 5.2 Interacting Causal Pathway to Conflict in Syria 
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enough problems that the Syrian government failed to properly address. And as many scholars 
have recognized, there was already large-scale migration from rural areas to the cities, in 
addition to the migration of about 1.5 million Iraqi refugees. All of the ingredients for unrest 
were already present, and the Arab Spring provided the catalyst for the protests to begin. 
Interestingly, factionalism was not a major issue for the beginning of the protests, even 
considering that most Syrians from the northeast are ethnically Kurdish. Factional divisions 
become more apparent as the conflict devolved into civil war. Instead of causing the conflict, 
climate change exacerbated it by increasing the number of migrants and Syrians disillusioned 
with the government, making urban pressures more severe and increasing the number of 
potential protestors. 
Table 5.1 Strength of Factors Leading to Conflict, Coded as Weak, Fair, or Strong 







Would Conflict Occur 
with Climate Change in 
Isolation? 
Darfur Strong Fair Strong Possibly, but to a limited 
degree 
Syria Fair Fair Strong No 
 
The Case for Climate Change as an Intermediate Variable 
What do these findings mean for the climate change-conflict relationship? It is clear that climate 
change does not have a direct connection to intrastate conflict. Rather, it has an indirect 
connection, operating on conflict through its influence on other variables. Climate change has 
functioned as an intermediate variable to a fair degree in both cases. Excluding climate change 
from the causal pathway does not significantly alter the independent variables, or factors that led 
to the conflict in either case. Instead, climate change exacerbated the conflicts, making the 
factors that contributed to the conflict more severe. With the current severity of climate change, I 
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do not expect it to be an important factor for any other past and present conflict. As the impacts 
of climate change grow more severe with time, however, this may change. 
The mediating causal pathway is absent in both cases, but these were cases in which 
conflict was present. By analyzing cases that did not lead to conflict, the influence of the 
mediating pathway would be clearer. In these cases, mediating factors such as a strong economy, 
high state capacity, and community adaptability, may mean that conflict influenced by climate 
change may never occur.  
Climate change is unlikely to cause conflict in isolation. In one case, Darfur, it is possible 
that the presence of climate change in isolation would have led to conflict between the Arab and 
African tribes. The resulting conflict, however, would be at a significantly diminished scale 
because of the lack of participation from the government. This does ignore, however, the 
anthropogenic environmental degradation in Darfur and the role it played in accelerating 
desertification.  
Alternative Explanations 
 Is there any validity to other explanations for the relationship between climate change 
and conflict? There are four explanations to consider here. The first is whether climate change 
can cause conflict directly. These cases provide no evidence for this; climate change is entangled 
into a complicated interacting causal pathway, dependent on varying the independent variables to 
affect the conflict. The second is that climate change is a threat multiplier. This idea holds that 
climate change will increase the propensity for conflict in vulnerable regions. As demonstrated in 
these two cases, however, climate change only contributed to conflict to a limited degree, and 
and it is unlikely climate change would lead to conflict in isolation from other external factors. 
The third explanation, the critical explanation, posits that climate change can only influence 
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conflict if certain socioeconomic and political conditions are met. Put in another way, climate 
change can only affect conflict in the absence of a mediating causal pathway, or at least only 
when a weak mediating causal pathway is present. The two cases, here, do not have mediating 
causal pathways, and did influence conflict. It is impossible to prove this explanation with these 
two cases though, because there is no case that did not lead to conflict to test against. Lastly, the 
fourth explanation, the skeptical explanation, argues that the relationship between climate change 
and conflict is indeterminable or essentially insignificant. Through process tracing, I was able to 
















Scholars have wrestled with the climate change – conflict question for decades now but have 
failed to establish a consensus. This thesis has sought to contribute to the debate by making the 
case for defining climate change as an intermediate variable. By defining climate change this 
way, we can understand how climate change influences conflict indirectly through its effects on 
factors known to contribute to the conflict. We can also understand how climate change can be 
mediated by the present socioeconomic, political, and geographic conditions of each case. The 
cases I have analyzed show that climate change can influence conflict, but only to a limited 
degree. It is unlikely in either case that climate change would have led to conflict in isolation 
from external factors. Climate change can exacerbate conflicts, however, by making the factors 
that contribute to conflict more severe.   
Policy makers would be wise to recognize how the relationship between climate change 
and conflict is more complex than many assume. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests 
that climate change is not a threat multiplier. Conflicts in vulnerable areas can happen even 
without the presence of climate change, and other traditional factors play a considerably larger 
role. This is not to suggest that climate change should be ignored, however. In fact, as the 
climate change grows more severe, so will its effects on conflict. Rather, climate change should 
be considered with a more nuanced approach, with a consider how it operates within interrelated 
causal pathways that are context dependent. The rhetoric of policy makers should change to 
reflect this consideration. Otherwise, abusive regimes may use the public rhetoric surrounding 
climate change to evade responsibility to their citizens. We only need to look to the al-Assad 
regime of Syria for a recent example of this. 
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Climate change is the crisis of our time, but its effects are not yet fully known to us. Its 
effects on conflict, in particular, are considerably enigmatic. It is important to understand the 
climate change-conflict relationship in order to understand how conflicts begin and are shaped 
by climate change. This is an unprecedented factor in recorded history and has significant 
potential to affect conflict through the economy, resource shortages, and the devastation of 
livelihoods. If we do not understand how climate change influences conflict, we cannot 
understand how conflicts develop in the era of climate change. This understanding is necessary 
for policymakers to prevent and mediate conflicts. In this thesis, I have attempted to provide a 
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